[Dshield] Fw: [ISN] Judge: Man can't be forced to divulge encryption passphrase

aihomes at comcast.net aihomes at comcast.net
Mon Dec 17 23:15:48 GMT 2007

This case has some pretty far reaching implications. 

If a precedent like this survives higher appeals court scrutiny, does this spell doom for future forensic investigations of any kind because PGP or other encryption solution is implemented by the bad guys?

Maybe I'm reading this wrong...

Even more critical, will PGP take cues and start building a backdoor into later releases of their solution?

Sent from my BlackBerry® wireless handheld

-----Original Message-----
From: InfoSec News <alerts at infosecnews.org>

Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 00:14:19 
To:isn at infosecnews.org
Subject: [ISN] Judge: Man can't be forced to divulge encryption passphrase


Posted by Declan McCullagh
December 14, 2007

A federal judge in Vermont has ruled that prosecutors can't force a 
criminal defendant accused of having illegal images on his hard drive to 
divulge his PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) passphrase.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Jerome Niedermeier ruled that a man charged with 
transporting child pornography on his laptop across the Canadian border 
has a Fifth Amendment right not to turn over the passphrase to 
prosecutors. The Fifth Amendment protects the right to avoid 

Niedermeier tossed out a grand jury's subpoena that directed Sebastien 
Boucher to provide "any passwords" used with his Alienware laptop. 
"Compelling Boucher to enter the password forces him to produce evidence 
that could be used to incriminate him," the judge wrote in an order 
dated November 29 that went unnoticed until this week. "Producing the 
password, as if it were a key to a locked container, forces Boucher to 
produce the contents of his laptop."

Especially if this ruling is appealed, U.S. v. Boucher could become a 
landmark case. The question of whether a criminal defendant can be 
legally compelled to cough up his encryption passphrase remains an 
unsettled one, with law review articles for the last decade arguing the 
merits of either approach. (A U.S. Justice Department attorney wrote an 
article in 1996, for instance, titled "Compelled Production of Plaintext 
and Keys.")

This debate has been one of analogy and metaphor. Prosecutors tend to 
view PGP passphrases as akin to someone possessing a key to a safe 
filled with incriminating documents. That person can, in general, be 
legally compelled to hand over the key. Other examples include the U.S. 
Supreme Court saying that defendants can be forced to provide 
fingerprints, blood samples, or voice recordings.

Orin Kerr, a former Justice Department prosecutor who's now a law 
professor at George Washington University, shares this view. Kerr 
acknowledges that it's a tough call, but says, "I tend to think Judge 
Niedermeier was wrong given the specific facts of this case."

The alternate view elevates individual rights over prosecutorial 
convenience. It looks to other Supreme Court cases saying Americans 
can't be forced to give "compelled testimonial communications" and 
argues the Fifth Amendment must apply to encryption passphrases as well. 
Courts already have ruled that that such protection extends to the 
contents of a defendant's minds, so why shouldn't a passphrase be 
shielded as well?

In this case, Judge Niedermeier took the second approach. He said that 
encryption keys can be "testimonial," and even the prosecution's 
alternative of asking the defendant to type in the passphrase when 
nobody was looking would be insufficient.

Laptop files: Unencrypted, then encrypted

A second reason this case is unusual is that Boucher was initially 
arrested when customs agents stopped him and searched his laptop when he 
and his father crossed the border from Canada on December 17, 2006. An 
officer opened the laptop, accessed the files without a password or 
passphrase, and allegedly discovered "thousands of images of adult 
pornography and animation depicting adult and child pornography."

Boucher was read his Miranda rights, waived them, and allegedly told the 
customs agents that he may have downloaded child pornography. But 
then--and this is key--the laptop was shut down after Boucher was 
arrested. It wasn't until December 26 that a Vermont Department of 
Corrections officer tried to access the laptop--prosecutors obtained a 
subpoena on December 19--and found that the Z: drive was encrypted with 
PGP, or Pretty Good Privacy. (PGP sells software, including whole disk 
encryption and drive-specific encryption. It's a little unclear what 
exactly happened, but one likely scenario is that Boucher configured PGP 
to forget his passphrase, effectively re-encrypting the Z: drive, after 
a few hours or days had elapsed.)

According to Niedermeier's written opinion, prosecutors sent Boucher a 
grand jury subpoena asking for the passwords because:

    Secret Service Agent Matthew Fasvlo, who has experience and training 
    in computer forensics, testified that it is nearly impossible to 
    access these encrypted files without knowing the password. There are 
    no "back doors" or secret entrances to access the files. The only 
    way to get access without the password is to use an automated system 
    which repeatedly guesses passwords. According to the government, the 
    process to unlock drive Z could take years, based on efforts to 
    unlock similarly encrypted files in another case. Despite its best 
    efforts, to date the government has been unable to learn the 
    password to access drive Z.

The opinion added:

    If the subpoena is requesting production of the files in drive Z, 
    the foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply. While the 
    government has seen some of the files on drive Z, it has not viewed 
    all or even most of them. While the government may know of the 
    existence and location of the files it has previously viewed, it 
    does not know of the existence of other files on drive Z that may 
    contain incriminating material. By compelling entry of the password 
    the government would be compelling production of all the files on 
    drive Z, both known and unknown.

Boucher is a Canadian citizen who is a lawful permanent resident in the 
United States and lives with his father in Derry, N.H. Two attorneys 
listed as representing him could not immediately be reached for comment 
on Friday.

So what happens next? It's possible that prosecutors will be able to 
establish that Boucher's laptop has child pornography on it without 
being able to access it: after all, there were at least two federal 
agents who looked at the laptop when the Z: drive was still unencrypted.

But if this ruling in the case is eventually appealed, it could have a 
far-reaching impact in a pro-privacy or pro-law-enforcement direction.

Michael Froomkin, a law professor at the University of Miami, has 
written that the government "would have a very hard time" trying to 
obtain a memorized passphrase. A similar argument, published in the 
University of Chicago Legal Forum in 1996, says:

    The courts likely will find that compelling someone to reveal the 
    steps necessary to decrypt a PGP-encrypted document violates the 
    Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 
    Because most users protect their private keys by memorizing 
    passwords to them and not writing them down, access to encrypted 
    documents would almost definitely require an individual to disclose 
    the contents of his mind. This bars the state from compelling its 
    production. This would force law enforcement officials to grant some 
    form of immunity to the owners of these documents to gain access to 

But prosecutors think they can split the idea of immunity into two 
halves: divulging the passphrase, and then using the passphrase to 
decrypt the files. A 1996 article by Philip Reitinger of the Department 
of Justice's computer crime section proposes a clever device for forcing 
a defendant to divulge a PGP passphrase and then convicting him anyway 
(remember, the passphrase lets the key be used to decrypt the document):

    Finally, even if the foregoing considerations require the government 
    to grant act-of-production immunity to compel production of a key, 
    the scope of the immunity should be quite narrow. The contents of 
    the key are not privileged, and it is the contents that will be used 
    to decrypt a document. Therefore, the government can use the 
    contents of the decrypted document without impediment. Unless the 
    government cannot authenticate the document to be decrypted without 
    using the act of production of the key, granting act-of-production 
    immunity should have little effect.

Translation: Giving a defendant limited immunity in terms of forcing 
them to turn over the passphrase can lead to a conviction. That's 
because the fellow technically isn't being convicted based on his 
passphrase; he's being convicted for what it unlocks. Isn't the law 

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