[unisog] New virus - not caught by central servers (fwd)
bulkf at dordt.edu
Tue Jul 27 20:32:43 GMT 2004
Do I detect some slight bias to the *nix platforms? ;)
Seriously, using attachment filtering is very effective, but in a
school environment it's a little more difficult to filter compressed
attachments. It's a best-practices behavior to compress large
attachments and multiple files, and pkzip seems to be the most popular
format. If the email system we used (GroupWise) supported a mechanism
where users could pick it up the messages themselves, that would be more
reasonable, but I think most end-users would end up infecting themselves
because they wouldn't use caution.
Although virus definitions are a reactive measure for outbreaks, they
are effective the longer-running ones. A several-hour delay in email
processing, by my measures, is not the worst thing in the world. It
happens at least monthly that one item in our email flow breaks down for
several hours. I'm usually the first to notice, and it's usually been
60 to 180 minutes. So delaying email processing, perhaps for just those
with attachments, doesn't sound so bad in the grand scheme of things.
>>> stevev at darkwing.uoregon.edu Tuesday, July 27, 2004 12:05:05 PM >>>
Frank Bulk writes:
> Has anyone considered a policy such that if a virus alert is medium
> higher, to shut down email flow (or, at least let it queue up at the
> edge) until the virus definitions for the campus' email antivirus
> solution has been updated?
Everyone suffers enough for the Windows users who create the worm
problem, by having to process worm emails, backscatter from failed
deliveries and badly implemented antivirus products that send
notifications back to forged senders, and the other ever-increasing
wastes of Internet resources caused by Windows security stupidity.
And you're suggesting that people adopt a policy that users of
everything other than Windows should give up _our_ email connectivity
because the Windows lusers are suffering through another worm
No thank you.
Rather than use what I think is the highly misguided approach of using
reactive virus filtering, we aggressively filter all the various
attachment types that propagate worms, which provides a substantial
level of proactive defense. Some of the worst offenders that have
virtually no legitimate purposes (.scr, .pif) get stripped entirely
incoming messages, and many other types that are legitimately used but
capable of progagating worms (.zips being the most common example) are
delivered with modified attachment names so Outlook can't
oh-so-helpfully open them automatically, but it's easy enough for
to recover the data if it's not a worm payload.
We're using the Procmail Email Sanitizer
(http://www.impsec.org/email-tools/procmail-security.html) for this on
our UNIX hosts; it's highly configurable and easily customizable.
However, unlike a virus-scanner, the interval between configuration
tweaks is often months instead of days since it eliminates whole
of potential worm threats rather than just the ones whose signatures
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